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Abstract
I shall argue that a resolution of the PvNP problem requires building
an iff bridge between the domain of provability and that of computabil-
ity. The former concerns how a human intelligence decides the truth
of number-theoretic relations, and is formalised by the first-order Peano
Arithmetic PA following Dededekind’s axiomatisation of Peano’s Postu-
lates. The latter concerns how a human intelligence computes the values
of number-theoretic functions, and is formalised by the operations of a
Turing Machine following Turing’s analysis of computable functions. I
shall show that such a bridge requires objective definitions of both an
‘algorithmic’ interpretation of PA, and an ‘instantiational’ interpretation
of PA. I shall show that both interpretations are implicit in the defini-
tion of the subjectively defined ‘standard’ interpretation of PA. However
the existence of, and distinction between, the two objectively definable
interpretations—and the fact that the former is sound whilst the latter
is not—is obscured by the extraneous presumption under the ‘standard’
interpretation of PA that Aristotle’s particularisation must hold over the
structure N of the natural numbers. I shall argue that recognising the
falseness of this belief awaits a paradigm shift in our perception of the
application of Tarski’s analysis (of the concept of truth in the languages
of the deductive sciences) to the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA. I shall
then show that an arithmetical formula [F ] is PA-provable if, and only if,
[F ] interprets as true under an algorithmic interpretation of PA. I shall
finally show how it then follows from Go¨del’s construction of a formally
‘undecidable’ arithmetical proposition that there is a Halting-type PA for-
mula which—by Tarski’s definitions—is algorithmically verifiable as true,
but not algorithmically computable as true, under a sound interpretation
of PA.
1 Introduction
I define what it means for a number-theoretic function to be:
(i) Instantiationally computable;
(ii) Algorithmically computable.
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I argue that P 6=NP if a number-theoretic function is instantiationally com-
putable but not algorithmically computable.
I then show in Lemma 10 below that if Aristotle’s particularisation is pre-
sumed valid over the structure N of the natural numbers—as is the case under
the standard interpretation of PA—then it follows from the instantiational na-
ture of the constructive definition of the Go¨del β-function1 that a primitive
recursive relation can be instantiationally equivalent to an arithmetical relation
where the former is algorithmically computable as always true over N whilst
the latter is instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable,
as always true over N .
I note that this argument cannot be formalised in ZF since functions are defined
extensionally as mappings. Hence ZF cannot recognise that a primitive recursive
relation may be instantiationally equivalent to, but computationally different
from, an arithmetical relation where the former is algorithmically computable
as always true over N whilst the latter is instantiationally computable, but not
algorithmically computable, as always true over N .
I therefore conclude in Theorem 1 that, if the standard interpretation of PA
is presumed sound, then P 6=NP.
I then consider an algorithmic interpretation of PA that yields P 6=NP in
Theorem 7, but which does not appeal to Aristotle’s particularisation and which
is provably sound.
2 The PvNP problem
In a 2009 survey of the status of the P versus NP problem, Lance Fortnow
wrote2:
“. . . in the mid-1980’s, many believed that the quickly developing
area of circuit complexity would soon settle the P versus NP prob-
lem, whether every algorithmic problem with efficiently verifiable
solutions have efficiently computable solutions. But circuit com-
plexity and other approaches to the problem have stalled and we
have little reason to believe we will see a proof separating P from
NP in the near future.
. . . As we solve larger and more complex problems with greater com-
putational power and cleverer algorithms, the problems we cannot
tackle begin to stand out. The theory of NP-completeness helps
us understand these limitations and the P versus NP problems be-
gins to loom large not just as an interesting theoretical question in
computer science, but as a basic principle that permeates all the
sciences.
. . . None of us truly understand the P versus NP problem, we have
only begun to peel the layers around this increasingly complex ques-
tion.”
1Introduced by Kurt Go¨del in Theorem VII ([Go31], pp.30-31) of his seminal 1931 paper
on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions.
2[Fo09].
2
2.1 Equivalent definitions of P, NP and P 6=NP
The formal definition of the class P by Stephen Cook3 admits a number-theoretic
function F—viewed set-theoretically as defining (and defined by) a unique sub-
set L of the set Σ∗ of finite strings over some non-empty finite alphabet set
Σ—in P if, and only if, some deterministic Turing machine TM accepts L and
runs in polynomial time.
In this investigation I interpret number-theoretic functions and relations over
an infinite domain D as pre-Cantorian computational instructions (which may,
or may not, be uniform) that, for any given sequence of allowable values to the
variables in the function/relation, determine how the function/relation is to be
evaluated—and whether, or not, the result of such evaluation yields a value (or
values)—in the domain D. I do not assume—as in Cantorian set theories—that
the evaluations always determine a completed infinity (set) that can be referred
to as a unique mathematical constant that identifies the function/relation in a
mathematical language (or its interpretation) outside of the set theory in which
the function/relation is defined.
Fortnow describes the PvNP problem informally as follows:
“In 1965, Jack Edmonds . . . suggested a formal definition of “efficient
computation” (runs in time a fixed polynomial of the input size).
The class of problems with efficient solutions would later become
known as P for “Polynomial Time”.
. . . But many related problems do not seem to have such an efficient
algorithm.
. . . The collection of problems that have efficiently verifiable solutions
is known as NP (for “Nondeterministic Polynomial-Time” . . . ).
So P=NP means that for every problem that has an efficiently veri-
fiable solution, we can find that solution efficiently as well.
. . . If a formula φ is not a tautology, we can give an easy proof of
that fact by exhibiting an assignment of the variables that makes φ
false. But if . . . there are no short proofs of tautology that would
imply P 6=NP.”
In an earlier paper presented to ICM 2002, Ran Raz explains4:
“A Boolean formula f(x1, . . . , xn) is a tautology if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1
for every x1, . . . , xn. A Boolean formula f(x1, . . . , xn) is unsatisfi-
able if f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 for every x1, . . . , xn. Obviously, f is a
tautology if and only if ¬f is unsatisfiable.
Given a formula f(x1, . . . , xn), one can decide whether or not f
is a tautology by checking all the possibilities for assignments to
x1, . . . , xn. However, the time needed for this procedure is exponen-
tial in the number of variables, and hence may be exponential in the
length of the formula f .
. . . P 6=NP is the central open problem in complexity theory and one
of the most important open problems in mathematics today. The
3[Cook].
4[Ra02].
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problem has thousands of equivalent formulations. One of these
formulations is the following:
Is there a polynomial time algorithm A that gets as input a Boolean
formula f and outputs 1 if and only if f is a tautology?
P 6=NP states that there is no such algorithm.”
Clearly, the issue of whether, or not, there is a polynomial time algorithm
A that gets as input a Boolean formula f and outputs 1 if and only if f is
a tautology is meaningful only if we can establish that there is an algorithm
A that gets as input a Boolean formula f and outputs 1 if and only if f is a
tautology.
Accordingly I show in Section 3.1 how it follows from Theorem VII5 of Kurt
Go¨del’s seminal 1931 paper—on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions—
that every recursive function f(x1, x2) is representable in PA by a formula
[F (x1, x2, x3)] such that [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)]6 is “efficiently verifiable”, but
not “efficiently computable”, if the standard interpretation of PA7—which pre-
sumes that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over the structureN of the natural
numbers—is sound.
Aristotle’s particularisation This holds that from an assertion
such as:
‘It is not the case that, for any given x, P ∗(x)8 does not
hold’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’, we may always validly
infer in the classical, Aristotlean, logic of predicates9 that:
‘There exists an unspecified x such that P ∗(x) holds’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)10’.
However, as L. E. J. Brouwer pointed out in a seminal 1908 paper11, the pre-
sumption that Aristotle’s particularisation holds overN lies beyond our common
intuition. In the rest of the investigation I therefore consider whether the above
conclusion would persist under any sound interpretation of PA.
We may express Aristotle’s particularisation in a contemporary context as:
From an assertion such as:
5cf. [Go31], p.29: Every recursive relation is arithmetical.
6The symbol ‘[∃1]’ denotes uniqueness, in the sense that the PA formula
[(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is a short-hand notation for the PA formula [¬(∀x3)¬F (x1, x2, x3) ∧
(∀y)(∀z)(F (x1 , x2, y) ∧ F (x1, x2, z)→ y = z)].
7See Section 5.1. I shall follow Alfred Tarski’s terminology and definitions of the satisfaction
and truth of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation as detailed in Section
5.
8Notation: The asterisk indicates that the expression is to be interpreted semantically with
respect to some well-defined interpretation. I shall aim to use this notation consistently in
this investigation.
9[HA28], pp.58-59.
10See Appendix A, Section 10 for the meaning and usage of the symbol denoting the exis-
tential quantifier in an interpretation.
11[Br08].
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‘It is not the case that, for any given x, any witness12 WD
of a domain D can decide that P ∗(x) does not hold in D’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’, we may always validly
infer that:
‘There exists an unspecified x such that any witness WD
of D can decide that P ∗(x) holds in D’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’.
I note that, prima facie, Brouwer’s objection seems valid since Aristotle’s par-
ticularisation does not hold if we take D as the domain of the natural numbers
and the witness WN as a Turing machine, since P
∗(x) may be a Halting-type
of number-theoretic relation.
Thus, to ensure that the arguments of this investigation are intuitionistically un-
objectionable, any assumption that the ‘standard’ interpretation IPA(N , Standard)
of PA is sound shall be explicit.
2.2 Defining instantiational computability and algorith-
mic computability
We introduce the two concepts13:
Definition 1 Instantiational computability: A Boolean number-theoretic
function14 [F (x1, . . . , xn)]
15 is instantiationally computable if, and only if, there
is a Turing machine TM that, for any given sequence of numerals [(a1, . . . , an)],
will accept the natural number input m if m is a unique identification number of
the formula [F (a1, . . . , an)], and will always then halt with one of the following
as output:
(i) 0 if [F (a1, . . . , an)] computes as 0 (or interprets as true) in N ;
(ii) 1 if [F (a1, . . . , an)] computes as 1 (or interprets as false) in N .
Definition 2 Algorithmic computability: A Boolean number-theoretic func-
tion [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically computable if, and only if, there is a Tur-
ing machine TMF that, for any given sequence of numerals [(a1, . . . , an)], will
accept the natural number input m if, and only if, m is a unique identification
number of the formula [F (a1, . . . , an)], and will always then halt with one of the
following as output:
(i) 0 if [F (a1, . . . , an)] computes as 0 (or interprets as true) in N ;
(ii) 1 if [F (a1, . . . , an)] computes as 1 (or interprets as false) in N .
The set of identification numbers m thus corresponds to the set-theoretically
defined language L accepted by TMF in Cook’s definition of the class P.
12The word ‘witness’ is intended to be construed broadly in its usual dictionary sense, and
not as a specifically defined technical term. However, see Section 5 for a more specific sense
of the term ‘witness’ as used in this investigation.
13My thanks to Dr. Chaitanya H. Mehta for advising that the focus of this investigation
should be the distinction between these two concepts.
14Strictly speaking, a formula of a formal language that interprets as a Boolean number-
theoretic function under a well-defined interpretation of the language.
15I shall use square brackets to differentiate a formal expression such as [F (a1, . . . , an)] from
its interpretation F ∗(x1, . . . , xn). See Appendix A, Section 10 for the notation and definitions
of standard terms as used in this investigation.
5
It is reasonable to assume that the following thesis will hold when the con-
cepts “efficiently verifiable” and “efficiently computable” are formalised in any
formal system of Arithmetic:
Thesis 1 (a) A PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is efficiently verifiable if, and only
if, it is instantiationally computable.
(b) If a PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is efficiently computable then it is algo-
rithmically computable. ✷
It follows that:
Lemma 1 If Thesis 1 holds, then P6=NP if a PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is
instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable.
Proof By Thesis 1, if [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is instantiationally computable, then it
is efficiently verifiable; whereas if [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is not algorithmically com-
putable, then it is not efficiently computable. ✷
Lemma 1 is intended to highlight the fact that the definition of a tautology
only requires that a Boolean number-theoretic function f(x1, . . . , xn) be com-
putable instantiationally as always true; unless we presume the Church-Turing
Thesis, it does not require that f(x1, . . . , xn) be partial recursive, and therefore
computable algorithmically as always true.
I shall argue in Section 8 that (as in the case of interpretations of PA in Section
5) it is an implicit belief in the plausibility of—or informal reliance upon16—
the Church-Turing Thesis that obscures the distinction between ‘instantiational’
computability and ‘algorithmic’ computability.
The question thus arises: Is there a Halting-type PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)]
that is computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically, as always true
under a sound interpretation of PA?
2.3 Is there a Halting-type tautology?
To place this query in perspective I note that:
Lemma 2 If PA has a sound interpretation IPA(N , Sound) over N , then any
PA-provable formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is instantiationally computable as always
true over N under IPA(N , Sound).
Proof Go¨del has shown how we can algorithmically assign a unique natural
(Go¨del) number to each PA formula and to each finite sequence of PA formulas17.
Go¨del has also shown how we can construct a primitive recursive relation xBy18
that holds if, and only if, x is the Go¨del number of a proof sequence in PA, and
y is the Go¨del number of the last formula of the sequence.
Now, if the PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is PA-provable then, for any given se-
quence of numerals [(a1, . . . , an)], the PA formula [F (a1, . . . , an)] is PA-provable.
16See, for instance, [Rg87], p.21, “Almost all the proofs in this book will use Church’s Thesis
to some extent”.
17[Go31], p.13.
18[Go31], p.22(45)
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Hence xB⌈[F (a1, . . . , an)]⌉19 always holds for some x. Since xBy is recursive,
there is a Turing machine TMB that will accept m if m is ⌈[F (a1, . . . , an)]⌉ and
halt with output ‘provable’.
Since a PA-provable formula is true under IPA(N , Sound), the lemma follows.
✷
Although the following argument is informal, a formal proof follows im-
mediately from Section 6.2, where I show in Theorem 4 that an algorithmic
interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) of PA—under which a PA-provable formula
is algorithmically computable as always true over N—is sound.
Lemma 3 If PA has a sound interpretation IPA(N , Sound) over N , then any
PA-provable formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically computable as always
true over N .
Proof If a PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is PA-provable, then there is a finite
proof sequence in PA whose last member is [F (x1, . . . , xn)]. Under any sound
interpretation of PA over N this sequence must20 interpret as an algorithm
(program) of fixed size that, for any sequence [(a1, . . . , an)] of PA numerals,
decides [F (a1, . . . , an)] as true. This algorithm defines a Turing machine TMF
that, for any natural number sequence (a1, . . . , an), will:
(i) accept the natural number m if, and only if, m is the Go¨del
number of [F (a1, . . . , an)];
(ii) halt on any such input m with output ‘true’.
The lemma follows. ✷
Lemma 4 If PA has a sound interpretation IPA(N , Sound) over N , then we
may reasonably assume that any PA-provable formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is in-
stantiationally computable as always true over N in polynomial time under
IPA(N , Sound).
Proof If the PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] is PA-provable then there is a se-
quence [S1, S2, . . . , Sk] of PA formulas each of which is either a PA-axiom, or a
consequence of the PA axioms and the preceding formulas in the sequence by
application of some Rule of Deduction of PA, and where Sk is [F (x1, . . . , xn)].
Further, for any given sequence of numerals [a1, . . . , an], the PA formula [F (x1,
. . . , xn) → F (a1, . . . , an)] is PA-provable. Hence there is a proof sequence
[S1, S2, . . . , Sk, Sk+1, . . . , Sl] such that Sl is [F (a1, . . . , an)].
Now it follows in any system of Go¨del numbering such as that defined by
Go¨del in his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical proposi-
tions21 that ⌈[S1, S2, . . . , Sk, Sk+1, . . . , Sl]⌉ = ⌈[S1, S2, . . . , Sk]⌉ ⋆ c(a1, . . . , an),
where c(a1, . . . , an) is a constant whose value is determined by the sequence
(a1, . . . , an).
Now xB⌈[F (x1, . . . , xn)]⌉ holds for x = ⌈[S1, S2, . . . , Sk]⌉, whilst xB⌈[F (a1, . . . ,
an)]⌉ holds for x = ⌈[S1, S2, . . . , Sk, Sk+1, . . . , Sl]⌉. Hence if the Turing ma-
chine TMB ‘computes’ [F (x1, . . . , xn)] as ‘true’ in time t, then it will ‘compute’
[F (a1, . . . , an)] as ‘true’ in time t ⋆ c′(a1, . . . , an) where c′(a1, . . . , an) is a con-
stant whose value is determined by the sequence (a1, . . . , an).
It is reasonable to presume that t can be treated as a measure that is representa-
tive of the length of the program of the Turing machine TMF defined in Lemma
3. The lemma follows. ✷
19⌈[F (a1, . . . , an)]⌉ denotes the Go¨del number of [F (a1, . . . , an)].
20For a proof of the necessity see Section 7, Theorem 6.
21[Go31], p.13.
7
I further note that:
Lemma 5 If PA has a sound interpretation IPA(N , Sound) over N , then there
is a PA formula [F ] which is instantiationally computable as always true over
N under IPA(N , Sound) even though [F ] is not PA-provable.
Proof Go¨del has shown how to construct an arithmetical formula with a single
variable—say [R(x)]22—such that [R(x)] is not PA-provable23, but [R(n)] is
instantiationally PA-provable for any given PA numeral [n]. Hence, for any
given numeral [n], the PA formula xB⌈[R(n)]⌉ must hold for some x. The
lemma follows. ✷
The question arises: Is there a Turing machine TMR that, for any given
numeral [n], accepts the natural number input m if, and only if, m is the Go¨del
number of [R(n)], and halts with output 0 if [R(n)] is true under IPA(N , Sound),
and with output 1 if [R(n)] is false under IPA(N , Sound)?
Obviously there can be no such algorithm if [R(x)] is a Halting-type formula
such that there would be some putative Go¨del number ⌈[R(n)]⌉ on which any
putative Turing machine TMR defined as above cannot output either 0 or 1.
This could be the case if the definition of the formula in question references—
either directly or indirectly—algorithmic computations of some number-theoretic
functions over N . Such reference occurs in Go¨del’s definition of [R(x)], which in-
volves an explicit—and deliberate—self-reference. However it also occurs—albeit
implicitly—in Go¨del’s proof that any recursive Boolean function such as x0 =
f(x1, x2) is representable by a PA formula [F (x0, x1, x2)]24. The proof involves
defining [F (x0, x1, x2)] only by its instantiations. Moreover, for any given numer-
als [k, m], the instantiation [F (k,m, i)] is defined in terms of Go¨del’s β-function
(see Section 3.1.1)—which is such that β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) represents the first m
terms, i.e. f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . , f(k,m) of f(k, x2). Thus [F (x0, x1, x2)] implicitly
references the values of a putative β(u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2), i) which would represent
the sequence f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, x2) for unspecified x1, x2 over N .
The thesis that I shall seek to address formally in this investigation25 is thus:
Thesis 2 Under any sound interpretation of PA, Go¨del’s [R(x)] is instantia-
tionally computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true in N .
Moreover, I shall seek to show why—as Fortnow appears to suggest—resolving
the PvNP problem may not be the major issue; the harder part may be altering
our attitudes and beliefs so that we can see what is obstructing such a resolution.
3 Bridging provability and computability
In a 1956 letter26 to John von Neumann, Go¨del raised an issue of computational
complexity that is commonly accepted as a precursor of the PvNP problem:
22Go¨del refers to this formula only by its Go¨del number r ([Go31], p.25(12)).
23Go¨del’s aim in [Go31] was to show that [(∀x)R(x)] is not P-provable; by Generalisation
it follows, however, that [R(x)] is also not P-provable.
24[Go31], p.29, Theorem VII.
25See Section 7, Corollary 8.
26See [Go56] for a translation as provided by Juris Hartmanis.
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One can obviously easily construct a Turing machine, which for every formula F
in first order predicate logic and every natural number n, allows one to decide if
there is a proof of F of length n (length = number of symbols). Let Ψ(F, n) be
the number of steps the machine requires for this and let φ(n) = maxFΨ(F, n).
The question is how fast φ(n) grows for an optimal machine. One can show that
φ(n) ≥ K.n. If there really were a machine with f(n) ≈ K.n (or even ≈ K.n2),
this would have consequences of the greatest importance. Namely, it would
obviously mean that in spite of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem,
the mental work of a mathematician concerning Yes-or-No questions could be
completely replaced by a machine. After all, one would simply have to choose
the natural number n so large that when the machine does not deliver a result, it
makes no sense to think more about the problem. Now it seems to me, however,
to be completely within the realm of possibility that φ(n) grows that slowly.
Since it seems that φ(n) = K.n is the only estimation which one can obtain by
a generalization of the proof of the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem
and after all φ(n) ≈ K.n (or ≈ K.n2) only means that the number of steps
as opposed to trial and error can be reduced from N to log N (or (log N)2).
However, such strong reductions appear in other finite problems, for example in
the computation of the quadratic residue symbol using repeated application of
the law of reciprocity. It would be interesting to know, for instance, the situation
concerning the determination of primality of a number and how strongly in
general the number of steps in finite combinatorial problems can be reduced
with respect to simple exhaustive search.
Clearly issues of computational complexity—such as those raised by Go¨del
above—are finitary concerns involving number-theoretic functions and relations
containing quantification over N that lie naturally within the domains of:
(a) First-order Peano Arithmetic PA, which attempts to capture in
a formal language the objective essence of how a human intelligence
intuitively reasons about number-theoretic predicates, and;
(b) Computability Theory, which attempts to capture in a formal
language the objective essence of how a human intelligence intu-
itively computes number-theoretic functions.
Moreover, since Go¨del had already shown in 1931 that every recursive re-
lation can be expressed arithmetically27, his formulation of the computational
complexity of a number-theoretic problem in terms of formal arithmetical prov-
ability suggests that we ought to persist in seeking, conversely, an algorithmic
interpretation of first-order PA28 in Computability Theory, so that any number-
theoretic problem can be expressed—and addressed—formally in PA, and its so-
lution, if any, interpreted algorithmically in Computability Theory. I investigate
this in detail in Section 5.
3.1 Go¨del’s Theorem V and formally unprovable but in-
terpretively true propositions
Now, by Go¨del’s Theorem V29, every recursive relation f(x1, . . . , xn) can be
expressed in PA by a formula [F (x1, . . . , xn)] such that, for any given n-tuple
of natural numbers a1, . . . , an:
27[Go31], Theorem VII, p.31.
28Part of the finitary consistency proof for PA sought by Hilbert in his ‘program’ ([Hi30],
pp.485-494).
29[Go31], p.22.
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If f(a1, . . . , an) is true, then PA proves [F (a1, . . . , an)]
If ¬f(a1, . . . , an) is true, then PA proves [¬F (a1, . . . , an)]
Go¨del relies only on the above to conclude—in his Theorem VI30—the ex-
istence of an arithmetical proposition that is formally unprovable in a Peano
Arithmetic, but true under a sound interpretation of the Arithmetic.
However, I now show that it is Go¨del’s Theorem VII31 which—for recursive
relations of the form x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) defined by the Recursion Rule
32—
provides an actual blueprint for the construction of PA formulas that are PA-
unprovable, but true under the standard interpretation of PA.
Moreover, I shall show that this Go¨delian characteristic is merely a reflection
of the fact that, by the instantiational nature of their constructive definition in
terms of Go¨del’s β-function, such formulas are designed to be instantiationally
computable, but not algorithmically computable, under the standard interpre-
tation of PA.
3.1.1 Every recursive function is representable in PA
I note some standard definitions and results (which implicitly presume33 that
the standard interpretation of PA is sound, hence quantifiers are interpreted
under the assumption that Aristotle’s particularisation is valid over N ).
Go¨del has defined a primitive recursive function—Go¨del’s β-function—as34:
β(x1, x2, x3) = rm(1 + (x3 + 1) ⋆ x2, x1)
where rm(x1, x2) denotes the remainder obtained on dividing x2 by x1.
Go¨del showed that:
Lemma 6 For any non-terminating sequence of values f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . ., we
can construct natural numbers b, c such that:
(i) j = max(n, f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, n));
(ii) c = j!;
(iii) β(b, c, i) = f(x1, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof This is a standard result35. We reproduce Go¨del’s original argument of
this critical lemma in an Appendix B, Section 11. ✷
Now we have the standard definition36:
Definition 3 A number-theoretic function f(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be repre-
sentable in PA if, and only if, there is a PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn+1)] with the
free variables [x1, . . . , xn+1], such that, for any given natural numbers k1, . . . , kn+1:
30[Go31], p.24.
31[Go31], p.29.
32[Me64], p.120 & p.132.
33Such an implicit presumption is seen in Go¨del’s reference in the statement of his Theorem
IX to the negation of a universally quantified formula of the restricted functional calculus as
indicative of “the existence of a counter-example” ([Go31], p.32).
34cf. [Go31], p.31, Lemma 1; [Me64], p.131, Proposition 3.21.
35cf. [Go31], p.31, p.31, Lemma 1; [Me64], p.131, Proposition 3.22.
36[Me64], p.118.
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(i) if f(k1, . . . , kn) = kn+1 then PA proves: [F (k1, . . . , kn, kn+1)];
(ii) PA proves: [(∃1xn+1)F (k1, . . . , kn, xn+1)].
The function f(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be strongly representable in PA if we
further have that:
(iii) PA proves: [(∃1xn+1)F (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1)]
We then have:
Lemma 7 β(x1, x2, x3) is strongly represented in PA by [Bt(x1, x2, x3, x4)],
which is defined as follows:
[(∃w)(x1 = ((1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2) ⋆ w+ x4)∧ (x4 < 1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2))].
Proof This is a standard result37. ✷
Go¨del further showed that:
Lemma 8 If f(x1, x2) is a recursive function defined by:
(i) f(x1, 0) = g(x1)
(ii) f(x1, (x2 + 1)) = h(x1, x2, f(x1, x2))
where g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions of lower rank
38 that are
represented in PA by well-formed formulas [G(x1, x2)] and [H(x1, x2, x3, x4)],
then f(x1, x2) is represented in PA by the following well-formed formula, denoted
by [F (x1, x2, x3)]:
[(∃u)(∃v)(((∃w)(Bt(u, v, 0, w)∧G(x1 , w)))∧Bt(u, v, x2, x3)∧(∀w)(w <
x2 → (∃y)(∃z)(Bt(u, v, w, y)∧Bt(u, v, (w+1), z)∧H(x1, w, y, z)))].
Proof This is a standard result39. In view of the significance of this lemma for
the resolution of the PvNP problem offered in Lemma 10 below, we reproduce
Go¨del’s original argument and proof of the lemma in Appendix B, Section 11.✷
3.2 What does “[(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is provable” assert under
the standard interpretation of PA?
Now, if the PA formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] represents in PA the recursive function de-
noted by f(x1, x2) then by definition, for any given numerals [k,m], the formula
[(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is provable in PA; and true under any sound interpretation
of PA. We thus have that:
Lemma 9 If we assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then:
“[(∃1x3)F (k, m, x3)] is true under the standard interpretation of
PA”
37cf. [Me64], p.131, proposition 3.21.
38cf. [Me64], p.132; [Go31], p.30(2).
39cf. [Go31], p.31(2); [Me64], p.132.
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is the assertion that:
Given any natural numbers k,m, we can construct natural numbers
t(k,m), u(k,m), v(k,m)—all functions of k,m—such that:
(a) β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 0) = g(k);
(b) for all i < m, β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) = h(k, i, f(k, i));
(c) β(u(k,m), v(k,m),m) = t(k,m);
where f(x1, x2), g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are any recursive functions
that are formally represented in PA by F (x1, x2, x3), G(x1, x2) and
H(x1, x2, x3, x4) respectively such that:
(i) f(k, 0) = g(k)
(ii) f(k, (y + 1)) = h(k, y, f(k, y)) for all y < m
(iii) g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions that
are assumed to be of lower rank than f(x1, x2).
Proof For any given natural numbers k and m, if [F (x1, x2, x3)] interprets
as a well-defined arithmetical relation under the standard interpretation of
PA, then a Turing-machine can construct the sequences f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . ,
f(k,m) and β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 0), β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 1), . . . , β(u(k,m), v(k,m),m) and
verify the assertion. ✷
3.2.1 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then P6=NP
We now see that:
Lemma 10 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2,
x3)] is computable instantiationally, but not computable algorithmically, as al-
ways true over N .
Proof We assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound (hence we
may, for instance, conclude ‘There is some x such that . . . ’ from the assertion
‘It is not the case that for all x it is not the case that . . . ’ in the domain N of
the interpretation.). It then follows from Lemma 9 that:
(1) [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is PA-provable for any given numerals [k,m].
Hence [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is true under the standard interpretation
of PA. It then follows from the definition of [F (x1, x2, x3)] in Lemma
8 that, for any given natural numbers k,m, we can construct some
pair of natural numbers u(k,m), v(k,m)—where u(k,m), v(k,m) are func-
tions of the given natural numbers k and m—such that:
(a) β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) = f(k, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ m;
(b) F ∗(k,m, f(k,m)) holds in N .
Since β(x1, x2, x3) is primitive recursive, β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) defines a
constructible non-terminating sequence f ′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1), . . . for any
given natural numbers k and m such that:
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(c) f(k, i) = f ′(k, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
We can thus define a Turing machine TMβ(u(k,m),v(k,m),i) that will
accept the natural number input g if g is the Go¨del number of the
PA formula [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)], and then halt with output ‘true’.
Hence [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is computable instantiationally as always
true over N under the standard interpretation of PA.
(2) Now, the pair of natural numbers u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2) are defined
such that:
(a) β(u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2), i) = f(x1, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ x2;
(b) F ∗(x1, x2, f(x1, x2)) holds in N ;
where v(x1,x2) is defined in Lemma 8 as j! (see Lemma 3.2.1), and:
(c) j = max(n, f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, x2));
(d) n is the ‘number’ of terms in the sequence f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1),
. . . , f(x1, x2).
Since j is not definable for a non-terminating sequence, β(u(x1,x2),
v(x1,x2), i) we cannot construct a non-terminating sequence f
′(x1, 0),
f ′(x1, 1), . . . such that:
(e) f(k, i) = f ′(k, i) for all i ≥ 0.
We cannot thus define a Turing machine TMβ(u(x1,x2),v(x1,x2),i) that
will accept the natural number input g if, and only if, g is the Go¨del
number of the PA formula [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)], and then halt with
output ‘true’.
Hence [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is not computable algorithmically as al-
ways true over N under the standard interpretation of PA.
The lemma follows. ✷
It follows that:
Theorem 1 If Thesis 1 holds, and the standard interpretation of PA is sound,
then P6=NP.
Proof By Lemma 10, [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is computable instantiationally, but
not computable algorithmically, as always true over N . By Lemma 1, P 6=NP.✷
A critical issue that I do not address in this investigation is whether the PA for-
mula [F (x1, x2, x3] can be considered to interpret under a sound interpretation of
PA as a well-defined predicate since the denumerable sequences f ′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1),
. . . , f ′(k,m), mp—where p > 0, and mp is not equal to mq if p is not equal to
q—are represented by denumerable, distinctly different, functions β(xp1 , xp2 , i)
respectively. There are thus denumerable pairs (xp1 , xp2 ) for which β(xp1 , xp2 , i)
yields any given sequence f ′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1), . . . , f ′(k,m).
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4 Is Go¨del’s undecidable arithmetical proposi-
tion a one-off anomaly?
It also follows from the preceding section that:
Corollary 1 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2,
x3)] is not PA-provable.
Proof If [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] were PA-provable then, by Lemma 3, there would
be an algorithm that decides [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] as always true under the
standard interpretation of PA. By Lemma 10 this is not the case. The corollary
follows. ✷
Now, the counter-intuitive element in Go¨del’s conclusions in his 1931 pa-
per has occasionally given rise to the perception that ‘undecidable’ Go¨delian
propositions are artificially constructed anomalies which are not likely to be en-
countered in, or have any appreciable significance for, mainstream mathematics.
However, this may not be a realistic perception since the first part of Go¨del’s
Theorem VI40 is merely a special case of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 If PA is consistent and the PA formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] represents
the recursive function f(x1, x2), then:
(a) [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is PA-provable for any given numerals [k], [m];
(b) [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is not PA-provable.
Proof (a) By definition [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is PA-provable for any given nu-
merals [k], [m] if the PA formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] represents the recursive function
f(x1, x2).
(b) If [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] were PA-provable, then it would be algorithmi-
cally computable as true under the standard interpretation of PA. By Lemma
10, this is not the case. The theorem follows. ✷
If, further, we assume that the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then
it follows from (a) that the second part of Go¨del’s Theorem VI41 is a special
case of the following:
Lemma 11 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then [¬(∃1x3)F (x1,
x2, x3)] is not PA-provable.
Proof [¬(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is an abbreviation of the PA formula:
[(∀x3)¬F (x1, x2, x3) ∧ (∀y)(∀z)(F (x1, x2, y) ∧ F (x1, x2, z)→ y = z)].
Under any sound interpretation of PA over N , the latter formula interprets
as the arithmetical relation denoted by:
(∀x3)¬F ∗(x1, x2, x3) ∧ (∀y)(∀z)(F ∗(x1, x2, y) ∧ F ∗(x1, x2, z)→ y = z).
If the standard interpretation of PA is sound then Aristotle’s particularisa-
tion holds over N , and this relation can be equivalently denoted by:
40[Go31], p.25(1).
41[Go31], p.25(2).
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¬(∃x3)F ∗(x1, x2, x3) ∧ (∀y)(∀z)(F ∗(x1, x2, y) ∧ F ∗(x1, x2, z)→ y = z).
It follows that if [¬(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is PA-provable, then ¬(∃x3)F ∗(x1, x2,
x3) is always true over N .
However, this is false since (∃x3)F ∗(x1, x2, x3) is always true over N by
Definition 3. The lemma follows. ✷
We thus have:
Corollary 2 If the standard interpretation of PA is sound, then [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)]
is undecidable in PA. ✷
Proof The corollary follows from Theorem 2(b) and Lemma 11. ✷
4.1 The significance of omega-consistency and Hilbert’s
program
The significance of Corollary 2 is that, in order to avoid intuitionistic objec-
tions to his reasoning in [Go31], Go¨del did not assume that the standard in-
terpretation of PA is sound. Instead, Go¨del introduced the syntactic property
of ω-consistency as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning42. Go¨del
explained at some length43 that his reasons for introducing ω-consistency as
an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning was to avoid appealing to the
stronger, semantic, concept of classical arithmetical truth—a concept which is
implicitly based on an intuitionistically objectionable logic that assumes Aris-
totle’s particularisation is valid over N .
However, I now show that if we assume the standard interpretation of PA is
sound, then PA is consistent if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
4.1.1 Hilbert’s ω-Rule
Assuming that PA has a sound interpretation over N , is it true that:
Algorithmic ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)]
interprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x) that is algorithmically
decidable as true for any given natural number n, then the PA for-
mula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in
PA?
The significance of this query is that, as part of his program for giving
mathematical reasoning a finitary foundation, Hilbert44 proposed an ω-Rule
as a finitary means of extending a Peano Arithmetic to a possible completion
(i.e. to logically showing that, given any arithmetical proposition, either the
proposition, or its negation, is formally provable from the axioms and rules of
inference of the extended Arithmetic):
Hilbert’s ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] in-
terprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x) that is true for any given
natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted
as an initial formula (axiom) in PA.
42[Go31], p.23 and p.28.
43In his introduction on p.9 of [Go31].
44cf. [Hi30], pp.485-494.
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Now, in his 1931 paper—which can, not unreasonably, be seen as the out-
come of a presumed attempt to validate Hilbert’s ω-rule—Go¨del introduced the
concept of ω-consistency45, from which it follows that:
Lemma 12 If we meta-assume Hilbert’s ω-rule for PA, then a consistent PA
is necessarily ω-consistent46. ✷
Proof If the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F ∗(x)
that is true for any given natural number n, and the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)]
can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA, ¬[(∀x)F (x)] cannot be
PA-provable if PA is consistent. The lemma follows. ✷
Moreover, it follows from Go¨del’s 1931 paper that one consequence of assum-
ing Hilbert’s ω-Rule is that there must, then, be an undecidable arithmetical
proposition47; a further consequence of which is that PA is essentially incom-
plete.
However, since Go¨del’s argument in this paper—from which he concludes the
existence of an undecidable arithmetical proposition—is based on the weaker
(i.e., weaker than assuming Hilbert’s ω-rule) premise that a consistent PA can
be ω-consistent, the question arises whether an even weaker Algorithmic ω-
Rule (which, prima facie, does not imply that a consistent PA is necessarily
ω-consistent) can yield a finitary completion for PA as sought by Hilbert, albeit
for an ω-inconsistent PA.
4.1.2 Aristotle’s particularisation and ω-consistency
I shall now argue that these issues are related, and that placing them in an
appropriate perspective requires questioning not only the persisting belief that
Aristotle’s 2000-year old logic of predicates—a critical component of which is
Aristotle’s particularisation—remains valid even when applied over an infinite
domain such as N , but also the basis of Brouwer’s denial of the Law of the
Excluded Middle following his challenge of the belief in 190848.
Now, we have that:
Lemma 13 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then there is some PA
formula [F (x)] such that, under any sound interpretation—say IPA(N , Sound)—
of PA over N :
(i) for any given numeral [n], the PA formula [F (n)] interprets as
true under IPA(N , Sound);
(ii) the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N , Sound).
45[Go31], p.23.
46However, we cannot similarly conclude from the the Algorithmic ω-Rule that a consistent
PA is necessarily ω-consistent.
47Go¨del constructed an arithmetical proposition [R(x)] and showed that, if a Peano Arith-
metic is ω-consistent, then both [(∀x)R(x)] and [¬(∀x)R(x)] are unprovable in the Arithmetic
([Go31], p.25(1), p.26(2)).
48[Br08].
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Proof The lemma follows from the definition of ω-consistency and from Tarski’s
standard definitions49 of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal
system such as PA under an interpretation as detailed in Section 5. ✷
Further:
Lemma 14 If the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N ),
then it is not the case that, for any given PA numeral [n], the PA formula
[F (n)] interprets as true under IPA(N ).
Proof The lemma follows from Tarski’s standard definitions of the satisfaction,
and truth, of the formulas of a formal system such as PA under an interpretation.
✷
It follows that:
Lemma 15 If the interpretation IPA(N ) admits Aristotle’s particularisation
over N 50, and the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N ),
then there is some unspecified PA numeral [m] such that the PA formula [F (m)]
interprets as false under IPA(N ).
Proof The lemma follows from Aristotle’s particularisation and Tarski’s stan-
dard definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system
such as PA under an interpretation. ✷
Hence:
Lemma 16 If PA is consistent and Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N ,
there can be no PA formula [F (x)] such that, under any sound interpretation
IPA(N , Sound) of PA over N :
(i) for any given numeral [n], the PA formula [F (n)] interprets as
true under IPA(N , Sound);
(ii) the PA formula [¬(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N , Sound).
Proof The lemma follows from the previous two lemma. ✷
In other words51:
Corollary 3 If PA is consistent and Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N ,
then PA is ω-consistent. ✷
It follows that:
Lemma 17 If Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N , then PA is consistent
if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
49[Ta33]; see also [Ho01] for an explanatory exposition. However, for standardisation and
convenience of expression, I follow the formal exposition of Tarski’s definitions given in [Me64],
p.50.
50As, for instance, in [Me64], pp.51-52 V(ii).
51The above argument is made explicit in view of Martin Davis’ remark in [Da82], p.129,
that such a proof of ω-consistency may be “. . . open to the objection of circularity”.
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Proof If PA is ω-consistent then, since [n = n] is PA-provable for any given PA
numeral [n], we cannot have that [¬(∀x)(x = x)] is PA-provable. Since an in-
consistent PA proves [¬(∀x)(x = x)], an ω-consistent PA cannot be inconsistent.
✷
The arguments of this section and of the preceding Section 4 thus show that52
J. Barkley Rosser’s ‘extension’ of Go¨del’s argument53 succeeds in avoiding an
explicit assumption of ω-consistency only by implicitly appealing to Aristotle’s
particularisation.
4.2 Is PA ω-inconsistent?
Now, it follows from the preceding section that:
Corollary 4 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle’s particu-
larisation does not hold over N . ✷
As the classical, ‘standard’, interpretation of PA—say IPA(N , Standard)—
appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation54, it follows that:
Corollary 5 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then the standard inter-
pretation IPA(N , Standard) of PA is not sound, and does not yield a model of
PA. ✷
Now, formal quantification in computational theory is currently interpreted—
as in classical logic55—so as to admit Aristotle’s particularisation over N as
axiomatic56.
However, if Aristotle’s particularisation does not hold over N , it would ex-
plain to some extent why efforts to resolve the PvNP problem by arguments
that appeal to classical Aristotlean logic cannot prevail.
5 The implicit Satisfaction Condition in Tarski’s
inductive assignment of truth-values under an
Interpretation
I shall now show that a sound algorithmic interpretation—say IPA(N , Algorithmic)
—of PA under which Aristotle’s particularisation does not hold over N is im-
plicit in the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA.
Moreover, the interpretation emerges naturally once we make explicit the
precise role of the implicit Satisfaction Condition in Tarski’s definitive 1933
paper on the concept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences57.
Now, Tarski essentially defines58:
52See also [An09b].
53[Ro36].
54See, for instance, [Me64], p.107 and p.52(V)(ii).
55See [Hi25], p.382; [HA28], p.48; [Be59], pp.178 & 218.
56In the sense of being intuitively obvious. See, for instance, [Da82], p.xxiv; [Rg87], p.308
(1)-(4); [EC89], p.174 (4); [BBJ03], p.102.
57[Ta33].
58cf. [Me64], p.51.
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Definition 4 If [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of a formal lan-
guage S, then a sequence (a1, a2, . . . , an) in the domain D of an interpretation
IS(D) of S satisfies [A] if, and only if:
(i) [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] interprets under IS(D) as a relation A
∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
in D for a witness WD of D;
(ii) A∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) holds in D if, and only if, ‖SATCON(IS(D))‖
holds for a witness WD of D;
where ‖SATCON(IS(D))‖ is some Satisfaction Condition that is always decid-
able by a witness WD of D.
Further, Tarski’s analysis shows how we can inductively assign truth values of
‘satisfaction’, ‘truth’, and ‘falsity’ as follows to the compound formulas of a first-
order theory S under the interpretation IS(D) in terms of only the satisfiability
of the atomic formulas of S over D59:
Definition 5 A sequence s of D satisfies [¬A] under IS(D) if, and only if, s
does not satisfy [A];
Definition 6 A sequence s of D satisfies [A→ B] under IS(D) if, and only if,
either it is not the case that s satisfies [A], or s satisfies [B];
Definition 7 A sequence s of D satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IS(D) if, and only if,
given any denumerable sequence t of D which differs from s in at most the i’th
component, t satisfies [A];
Definition 8 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is true under IS(D) if, and only
if, given any denumerable sequence t of D, t satisfies [A];
Definition 9 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is false under under IS(D) if,
and only if, it is not the case that, given any denumerable sequence t of D, t
satisfies [A].
It then follows that60:
Theorem 3 (Satisfaction Theorem) If, for any interpretation IS(D) of a first-
order theory S, there is a Satisfaction Condition ‖SATCON(IS(D))‖ which holds
for a witness WD of D, then:
(i) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable as either true or false over D under
IS(D);
(ii) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable as either true or as false over D
under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S.
Proof It follows from the above definitions that:
(a) If, for any given atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S, it is decidable by
WD whether or not a sequence (a1, a2, . . . , an) of D satisfies [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)]
in D under IS(D) then, for any given compound formula [A
1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of
59cf. [Me64], p.51.
60cf. [Me64], pp.51-53.
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S containing any one of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD
whether or not the sequence (a1, a2, . . . , an) of D satisfies [A1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in
D under IS(D);
(b) If, for any given compound formula [Bn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing n
of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable byWD whether or not a sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of D satisfies [Bn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D) then, for any
given compound formula [B(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing n + 1 of the
logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD whether or not the sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of D satisfies [B(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D);
We thus have that:
(c) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or false over D
under IS(D);
(d) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or as false
over D under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S. ✷
In other words, if the atomic formulas of of S interpret under IS(D) as decid-
able with respect to the Satisfaction Condition ‖SATCON(IS(D))‖ by a witness
WD over some domain D, then the propositions of S (i.e., the Πn and Σn for-
mulas of S) also interpret as decidable with respect to ‖SATCON(IS(D))‖ by
the witness WD over D.
I now consider the application of Tarski’s definitions to various interpreta-
tions of first-order Peano Arithmetic PA.
5.1 The standard interpretation of PA
The standard interpretation IPA(N , Standard) of PA is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic61;
(b) we define D as N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of N , we take ‖SATCON(IPA(N ))‖ as:
‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in N and, for any given sequence
(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) of N , the proposition A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) is
decidable in N‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N , Standard) informally as the ‘mathe-
matical intuition’ of a human intelligence for whom ‖SATCON(IPA(N ))‖
is always effectively decidable in N ;
Lemma 18 A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is always effectively decidable in N
by W(N , Standard).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then, for any
given sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . . , bn], the PA formula [A(b1, b2,
. . . , bn)] is an atomic formula of the form [c = d], where [c] and [d]
are atomic PA formulas that denote PA numerals. Since [c] and [d]
61Where the string [(∃ . . .)] is defined as—and is to be treated as an abbreviation for—
the string [¬(∀ . . .)¬]. We do not consider the case where the underlying logic is Hilbert’s
formalisation of Aristotle’s logic of predicates in terms of his ǫ-operator ([Hi27], pp.465-466).
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are recursively defined formulas in the language of PA, it follows
from a standard result62 that, if PA is consistent, then [c = d] is
algorithmically computable as either true or false in N . In other
words, if PA is consistent, then [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically
computable (since there is a Turing machine TMA that, for any given
sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . . , bn], will accept the natural number
m if, and only if, m is the Go¨del number of the PA formula [A(b1, b2,
. . . , bn)], and halt with output 0 if [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] interprets as
true in N ; and halt with output 1 if [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] interprets as
false in N ). The lemma follows. ✷
(e) we postulate that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N 63.
Clearly, (e) does not form any part of Tarski’s inductive definitions of the
satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of PA under the above interpretation.
Moreover, its inclusion makes IPA(N , Standard) extraneously non-finitary
64.
The question arises: Can we formulate the ‘standard’ interpretation of PA with-
out assuming (e) extraneously?
I answer this question affirmatively in Section 5.3 where:
(1) I replace the ‘mathematical intuition’ of a human intelligence by defining an
‘objective’ witness W(N , Instantiational) as the meta-theory MPA of PA;
(2) I show that W(N , Instantiational) can decide whether c
∗ = d∗ is true or false
by instantiationally computing the Boolean function A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for any
given sequence of natural numbers (b∗1 , b
∗
2 , . . . , b
∗
n);
(3) I show that this yields an instantiational interpretation of PA over [N ] that
is sound if, and only if, (e) holds.
(4) W(N , Instantiational) is thus an instantiational formulation of the standard
interpretation of PA over N (which is presumed to be sound).
I note further that if PA is ω-inconsistent, then Aristotle’s particularisation
does not hold over N , and the interpretation IPA(N , Standard) is not sound.
5.2 Go¨del’s non-standard interpretation of PA
A non-standard (Go¨delian) interpretation IPA(Nω , Non−standard) of a putative
ω-consistent PA is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as an undefined extension Nω of N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and sequence
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of Nω, we take ‖SATCON(IPA(Nω))‖ as:
‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in Nω and, for any given se-
quence (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) ofNω, the propositionA
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)
is decidable as either holding or not holding in Nω‖;
62For any natural numbers m, n, if m 6= n, then PA proves [¬(m = n)] ([Me64], p.110,
Proposition 3.6). The converse is obviously true.
63Hence a PA formula such as [(∃x)F (x)] interprets under IPA(N , Standard) as ‘There is
some natural number n such that F (n) holds in N .
64[Br08].
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(d) we postulate that ‖SATCON(IPA(Nω))‖ is always decidable by a
putative witness WNω , and that WNω can, further, determine some
numbers in Nω which are not natural numbers;
(e) we assume that PA is ω-consistent.
Clearly, the interpretation IPA(Nω , Non−standard) of a putative ω-consistent
PA cannot claim to be finitary. Moreover, if PA is ω-inconsistent, then the
Go¨delian non-standard interpretation IPA(Nω , Non−standard) of PA is also not
sound65.
5.3 An instantiational interpretation of PA in PA
I next consider the instantiational interpretation IPA(N , Instantiational) of PA
where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as PA;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA and any se-
quence [(a1, a2, . . . , an)] of PA numerals, we take ‖SATCON(IPA(PA))‖
as:
‖[A(a1, a2, . . . , an)] is provable in PA and, for any given
sequence of numerals [(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] of PA, the formula
[A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is decidable as either provable or not
provable in PA‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N , Instantiational) as the meta-theory
MPA of PA.
Lemma 19 [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is always effectively decidable in PA
by W(N , Instantiational).
Proof It follows from Go¨del’s definition of the primitive recursive
relation xBy66—where x is the Go¨del number of a proof sequence in
PA whose last term is the PA formula with Go¨del-number y—that, if
[A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA,MPA can effectively
decide instantiationally for any given sequence [(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] of
PA numerals which one of the PA formulas [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] and
[¬A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is necessarily PA-provable. ✷
Now, if PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then there is a Go¨delian for-
mula [R(x)] such that (see Section 7):
(i) [(∀x)R(x)] is not PA-provable;
(ii) [¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable;
(iii) for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable.
65In which case we cannot validly conclude from Go¨del’s formal reasoning in ([Go31]) that
PA must have a non-standard model.
66[Go31], p. 22(45).
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However, if IPA(N , Instantiational) is sound, then (ii) implies contradictorily
that it is not the case that, for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is PA-provable.
It follows that if IPA(N , Instantiational) is sound then PA is ω-consistent and,
ipso facto, Aristotle’s particularisation must hold over N .
Moreover, if PA is consistent, then every PA-provable formula interprets as
true under some sound interpretation of PA. HenceMPA can effectively decide
whether, for any given sequence of natural numbers (b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) in N , the
proposition A∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) holds or not in N .
It follows that IPA(N , Instantiational) is an instantiational formulation of the
‘standard’ interpretation of PA in which we do not need to extraneously assume
that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N .
The interpretation IPA(N , Instantiational) is of interest because, if it were a
sound interpretation of PA, then PA would establish its own consistency67!
5.4 A set-theoretic interpretation of PA
I consider next a set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF , Cantor) of PA over the
domain of ZF sets, which is obtained if, in IS(D):
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as ZF;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and sequence [(a1, a2, . . . , an)]
of PA, we take ‖SATCON(IS(ZF))‖ as:
‖[A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n)] is provable in ZF and, for any given
sequence [(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)] of ZF, the formula [A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n)]
is decidable as either provable or not provable in ZF‖;
(d) we define the witnessWZF as the meta-theoryMZF of ZF which
can always decide effectively whether or not ‖SATCON(IS(ZF))‖
holds in ZF.
Now, if the set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF, Cantor) of PA is sound, then
every sound interpretation of ZF would, ipso facto, be a sound interpretation of
PA. In Appendix C, Section 12 I show, however, that this is not the case, and
so the set-theoretic interpretation IPA(ZF, Cantor) of PA is not sound.
5.5 A purely algorithmic interpretation of PA
I finally consider the purely algorithmic interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) of PA
where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and sequence (a1, a2, . . . , an)
of N , we take ‖SATCON(IPA(N ))‖ as:
67cf. Go¨del’s Theorem XI in [Go31], p.36.
23
‖A∗(a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) holds in N and, for any given sequence
(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) of N , the proposition A
∗(b∗1, b
∗
2, . . . , b
∗
n) is
decidable as either holding or not holding in N‖;
(d) we define the witness W(N , Algorithmic) as a Turing machine
TMA∗ for whom ‖SATCON(IPA(N ))‖ is always effectively decidable
in N :
Lemma 20 A∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is always effectively decidable in N byW(N , Al−
gorithmic).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then, for any given
sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . . , bn], the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is an
atomic formula of the form [c = d], where [c] and [d] are atomic PA formulas
that denote PA numerals. Since [c] and [d] are recursively defined formulas in
the language of PA, it follows from a standard result68 that, if PA is consistent,
then [c = d] is algorithmically computable as either true or false in N . In other
words, if PA is consistent, then [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically computable
(since there is a Turing machine TMA that, for any given sequence of numerals
[b1, b2, . . . , bn], will accept the natural number m if, and only if, m is the Go¨del
number of the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)], and halt with output 0 if [A(b1, b2,
. . . , bn)] interprets as true in N ; and halt with output 1 if [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)]
interprets as false in N ). The lemma follows. ✷
It follows that IPA(N , Algorithmic) is an algorithmic formulation of the ‘stan-
dard’ interpretation of PA in which we do not extraneously assume that Aris-
totle’s particularisation holds over N .
I shall show that if IPA(N , Algorithmic) is sound, then PA is not ω-consistent.
Hence Aristotle’s particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation
is finitary and intuitionistically unobjectionable. Moreover—since the Law of
the Excluded Middle is provable in an ω-inconsistent PA (and therefore holds in
N )—it achieves this without the discomforting, stringent, Intuitionistic require-
ment that we reject the underlying logic of PA!
I now show that IPA(N , Algorithmic) is sound, and consider the consequences
for the PvNP problem and for Church’s Thesis.
6 The algorithmic interpretation of PA is sound
In Section 5 of this investigation I defined the two interpretations IPA(N , Standard)
and IPA(N , Algorithmic) in terms of Tarski’s
69 inductive definitions of the satis-
faction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system under an interpretation.
It thus follows by induction on k that70:
6.1 Interpreting quantification
Lemma 21 (Universal:Standard) A Πk PA formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] inter-
prets as true71 under IPA(N , Standard) if, and only if, for any given natural
number n, A∗(n) is true in N .
68For any natural numbers m, n, if m 6= n, then PA proves [¬(m = n)] ([Me64], p.110,
Proposition 3.6). The converse is obviously true.
69[Ta33].
70cf. [Me64], pp.51-53.
71See Definition 8
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Proof The lemma follows from the definition of IPA(N , Standard) by induction
on k. ✷
Lemma 22 (Universal:Algorithmic) A Πk PA formula such as [(∀x)A(x)] in-
terprets as true under IPA(N , Algorithmic) if, and only if, A
∗(x) is algorithmically
computable as always true in N .
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of IPA(N , Algorithmic) by induction
on k. ✷
Lemma 23 (Existential:Standard) A Σk PA formula such as [(∃x)A(x)]
72 in-
terprets as true under IPA(N , Standard) if, and only if, it is not true that, for
any given natural number n, A∗(n) is false in N , and we may conclude that
there exists some natural number n such that A∗(n) holds in N 73.
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of IPA(N , Standard) by induction
on k. ✷
Lemma 24 (Existential:Algorithmic) A Σk PA formula such as [(∃x) A(x)]
interprets as true under IPA(N , Algorithmic) if, and only if, ¬A
∗(x) is not al-
gorithmically computable as always true in N , but we may not conclude that
there exists some natural number n such that A∗(n) holds in N 74.
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of IPA(N , Algorithmic) by induction
on k. ✷
6.2 Interpreting the PA axioms
We note first that:
Lemma 25 The PA axioms PA1 to PA8 are algorithmically computable as al-
ways true over N under the interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic).
Proof Since [x + y], [x ⋆ y], [x = y], [x′] are defined recursively75, the PA
axioms PA1 to PA8 interpret as recursive relations that do not involve any
quantification. The lemma follows. ✷
Further:
Lemma 26 For any given PA formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema
[F (0)→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))) → (∀x)F (x))] interprets as true under IPA(N ,
Algorithmic).
Proof By Tarski’s Definitions 4 to 9:
72Note that [(∃x)A(x)] is merely the abbreviation for [¬(∀x)¬A(x)].
73Since Aristotle’s particularisation is assumed to hold in N under IPA(N , Standard).
74Since A∗(x) may be a Halting-type of relation such that, for any given natural number
n, it is meta-mathematically—even if not algorithmically—decidable that A∗(n) is false. As
I show in Section 7, Go¨del’s relation R(x) is precisely such a relation.
75cf. [Go31], p.17.
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(a) If [F (0)] interprets as false under IPA(N , Algorithmic) the lemma
is proved.
(b) If [F (0)] interprets as true and [(∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))] interprets
as false under IPA(N , Algorithmic), the lemma is proved.
(c) If [F (0)] and [(∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))] both interpret as true under
IPA(N , Algorithmic), then by the Satisfaction Theorem 3 and the
algorithmic interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) defined in Section 5.5,
[F (x)→ F (x′)] is algorithmically computable as always true over N
under IPA(N , Algorithmic).
There is thus a Turing machine TMF such that, for any natural
number n, TMF will accept the natural number m if, and only if,
m is the Go¨del number of [F (n)→ F (n′)] and will halt with output
‘true’.
Since [F (0)] interprets as true under IPA(N , Algorithmic), it follows
that there is a Turing machine TMF ′ such that, for any natural
number n, TMF ′ will accept the natural number m if, and only if,
m is the Go¨del number of [F (n)] and will halt with output ‘true’.
Hence [(∀x)F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true under
IPA(N , Algorithmic).
Since the above cases are exhaustive, the lemma follows. ✷
I note that the interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) settles the Poincare´-Hilbert
debate76 in the latter’s favour. Poincare´ believed that the Induction Axiom
could not be justified finitarily, as any such argument would necessarily need
to appeal to infinite induction. Hilbert believed that a finitary proof of the
consistency of PA was possible.
Similarly:
Lemma 27 Generalisation preserves truth under IPA(N , Algorithmic).
Proof The two meta-assertions:
‘[F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N , Algorithmic)
77’
and
‘[(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under IPA(N , Algorithmic)’
both mean:
[F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true under IPA(N ,
Algorithmic). ✷
It is also straightforward to see that:
Lemma 28 Modus Ponens preserves truth under IPA(N , Algorithmic). ✷
76See [Hi27], p.472; also [Br13], p.59; [We27], p482; [Pa71], p.502-503.
77See Definition 8
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We thus have that:
Lemma 29 The axioms of PA are always true under the finitary interpretation
IPA(N , Algorithmic), and the rules of inference of PA preserve the properties of
satisfaction/truth under IPA(N , Algorithmic). ✷
Hence:
Theorem 4 The interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) of PA is sound.
We thus have a finitary proof that:
Theorem 5 PA is consistent. ✷
7 A Provability Theorem for PA
I now show that PA can have no non-standard model, since it is ‘algorithmically’
complete in the sense that:
Theorem 6 (Provability Theorem for PA) A PA formula [F (x)] is PA-provable
if, and only if, [F (x)] is algorithmically computable in N .
Proof We have by definition that [(∀x)F (x)] interprets as true under the inter-
pretation IPA(N , Algorithmic) if, and only if, [F (x)] is algorithmically computable
in N .
Since IPA(N , Algorithmic) is sound, it defines a finitary model of PA over
N—say MPA(β)—such that:
If [(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then [F (x)] is algorithmically com-
putable in N ;
If [¬(∀x)F (x)] is PA-provable, then it is not the case that [F (x)] is
algorithmically computable in N .
Now, we cannot have that both [(∀x)F (x)] and [¬(∀x)F (x)] are PA-unprovable
for some PA formula [F (x)], as this would yield the contradiction:
(i) There is a finitary model—sayM1β—of PA+[(∀x)F (x)] in which
[F (x)] is algorithmically computable in N .
(ii) There is a finitary model—say M2β—of PA+[¬(∀x)F (x)] in
which it is not the case that [F (x)] is algorithmically computable
in N .
The lemma follows. ✷
Corollary 6 PA is categorical.
By the argument in Theorem 6 it follows that:
Corollary 7 The PA formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] defined in Lemma 5 is PA-provable.
✷
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Corollary 8 Under any sound interpretation of PA, Go¨del’s [R(x)] interprets
as an instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically computable, tautology
over N .
Proof Go¨del has shown that [R(x)]78 interprets as an instantiationally com-
putable tautology79. By Corollary 7 [R(x)] is not algorithmically computable
as always true in N . ✷
Theorem 7 P6=NP.
Proof By Corollary 8, [R(x)] is instantiationally computable, but not algorith-
mically computable over N . The theorem follows immediately from Lemma 1.
✷
Corollary 9 PA is not ω-consistent.80
Proof Go¨del has shown that if PA is consistent, then [R(n)] is PA-provable for
any given PA numeral [n]81. By Corollary 7 and the definition of ω-consistency,
if PA is consistent then it is not ω-consistent. ✷
Corollary 10 The standard interpretation IPA(N , Standard) of PA is not sound,
and does not yield a model of PA82.
Proof By Corollary 4 if PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle’s
particularisation does not hold over N . Since the ‘standard’, interpretation of
PA appeals to Aristotle’s particularisation, the lemma follows. ✷
Since formal quantification is currently interpreted in classical logic83 so as to ad-
mit Aristotle’s particularisation over N as axiomatic84, the above suggests that
we may need to review number-theoretic arguments85 that appeal unrestrictedly
to classical Aristotlean logic.
7.1 The Provability Theorem for PA and Bounded Arith-
metic
In a 1997 paper86, Samuel R. Buss considered Bounded Arithmetics obtained
by:
78Go¨del refers to this formula only by its Go¨del number r; [Go31], p.25, eqn.12.
79[Go31], p.26(2): “(n)¬(nBκ(17Gen r)) holds”
80This conclusion is contrary to accepted dogma. See, for instance, Davis’ remarks in
[Da82], p.129(iii) that “. . . there is no equivocation. Either an adequate arithmetical logic
is ω-inconsistent (in which case it is possible to prove false statements within it) or it has
an unsolvable decision problem and is subject to the limitations of Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem”.
81[Go31], p.26(2).
82I note that finitists of all hues—ranging from Brouwer [Br08] to Alexander Yessenin-
Volpin [He04]—have persistently questioned the soundness of the ‘standard’ interpretation
IPA(N , Standard).
83See [Hi25], p.382; [HA28], p.48; [Be59], pp.178 & 218.
84In the sense of being intuitively obvious. See, for instance, [Da82], p.xxiv; [Rg87], p.308
(1)-(4); [EC89], p.174 (4); [BBJ03], p.102.
85For instance—as shown in Sections 4 and 4.1—Rosser’s construction of an undecidable
arithmetical proposition in PA (see [Ro36])—which does not explicitly assume that PA is
ω-consistent—implicitly presumes that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N .
86[Bu97].
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(a) limiting the applicability of the Induction Axiom Schema in PA
only to functions with quantifiers bounded by an unspecified natural
number bound b;
(b) ‘weakening’ the statement of the axiom with the aim of differ-
entiating between effective computability over the sequence of nat-
ural numbers, and feasible ‘polynomial-time’ computability over a
bounded sequence of the natural numbers87.
Presumably Buss’ intent—as expressed below—is to build a bridge between
provability in a Bounded Arithmetic and Computability so that a Πk formula,
say [(∀x)f(x)], is provable in the Bounded Arithmetic if, and only if, there is an
algorithm that, for any given numeral [n], decides the ∆(k/(k−1)) formula [f(n)]
as ‘true’:
If [(∀x)(∃y)f(x, y)] is provable, then there should be an algorithm
to find y as a function of x88.
Since we have proven such a Provability Theorem for PA in the previous
section, the first question arises:
Does the introduction of bounded quantifiers yield any computational
advantage?
Now, one difference89 between a Bounded Arithmetic and PA is that we can
presume in the Bounded Arithmetic that, from a proof of [(∃y)f(n, y)], we may
always conclude that there is some numeral [m] such that [f(n,m)] is provable
in the arithmetic; however, this is not a sound conclusion in PA.
Reason: Since [(∃y)f(n, y)] is simply a shorthand for [¬(∀y)¬f(n, y)], such
a presumption implies that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over the natural
numbers under any sound interpretation of PA.
To see that (as Brouwer steadfastly held) this may not always be the case,
interpret [(∀x)f(x)] as90:
There is an algorithm that decides [f(n)] as ‘true’ for any given
numeral [n].
In such case, if [(∀x)(∃y)f(x, y)] is provable in PA, then we can only conclude
that:
There is an algorithm that, for any given numeral [n], decides that it
is not the case that there is an algorithm that, for any given numeral
[m], decides [¬f(n,m)] as ‘true’.
We cannot, however, conclude - as we can in a Bounded Arithmetic - that:
There is an algorithm that, for any given numeral [n], decides that
there is an algorithm that, for some numeral [m], decides [f(n,m)]
as ‘true’.
87See also [Pa71].
88See [Bu97].
89I suspect the only one.
90We have seen in the earlier sections that such an interpretation is sound.
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Reason: [(∃y)f(n, y)] may be a Halting-type formula for some numeral [n].
This could be the case if [(∀x)(∃y)f(x, y)] were PA-unprovable, but [(∃y)f(n, y)]
PA-provable for any given numeral [n].
Presumably it is the belief that any sound interpretation of PA requires
Aristotle’s particularisation to hold in N , and the recognition that the latter
does not admit linking provability to computability in PA, which has led to
considering the effect of bounding quantification in PA.
However, as we have seen in the preceding sections, we are able to link
provability to computability through the Provability Theorem for PA by recog-
nising precisely that, to the contrary, any interpretation of PA which requires
Aristotle’s particularisation to hold in N cannot be sound!
The postulation of an unspecified bound in a Bounded Arithmetic in order
to arrive at a provability-computability link thus appears dispensible.
The question then arises:
Does ‘weakening’ the PA Induction Axiom Schema yield any compu-
tational advantage?
Now, Buss considers a bounded arithmetic S2 which is, essentially, PA with
the following ‘weakened’ Induction Axiom Schema, PIND91:
[{f(0) & (∀x)(f(⌊x2 ⌋)→ f(x))} → (∀x)f(x)]
However, PIND can be expressed in first-order Peano Arithmetic PA as
follows:
[{f(0) & (∀x)(f(x)→ (f(2 ∗ x) & f(2 ∗ x+ 1)))} → (∀x)f(x)].
Moreover, the above is a particular case of PIND(k):
[{f(0) & (∀x)(f(x) → (f(k ∗ x) & f(k ∗ x + 1) & . . .&f(k ∗ x + k − 1)))} →
(∀x)f(x)].
Now we have the PA theorem:
[(∀x)f(x)→ {f(0) & (∀x)(f(x)→ f(x+ 1))}]
It follows that the following is also a PA theorem:
[{f(0) & (∀x)(f(x) → f(x+1))} → {f(0) & (∀x)(f(x)→ (f(k ∗ x) & f(k ∗ x+
1) & . . .& f(k ∗ x+ k − 1)))}]
In other words, for any numeral [k], PIND(k) is equivalent in PA to the
standard Induction Axiom of PA!
Thus, the Provability Theorem for PA suggests that all arguments and con-
clusions of a Bounded Arithmetic can be reflected in PA without any loss of
generality.
8 Church’s Thesis is false
One reason why efforts to prove P=NP remain unsuccessful may lie in recog-
nising that—contrary to accepted dogma92—the term ‘effective computability’
can be precisely defined. For instance, we can define:
91Where ⌊x
2
⌋ denotes the largest natural number lower bound of the rational x
2
.
92See [Kl52], p.300; [Me64], p.227; [Rg87], p.20; [EC89], p.85; [BBJ03], p23.
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Definition 10 A number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, and
only if, it is computable instantiationally.
Prima facie, this definition adequately captures our intuitive understanding
of the term ‘effective computability’.
Now, classical theory argues that (standard results):
Lemma 30 Every Turing-computable function (or relation, treated as a Boolean
function) F is partial recursive , and, if F is total , then F is recursive93. ✷
Lemma 31 Every partial recursive function (or relation, treated as a Boolean
function) is Turing-computable94. ✷
It follows that the following—essentially unverifiable but refutable—theses
are classically equivalent95:
Standard Church’s Thesis96 A number-theoretic function (or re-
lation, treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if,
and only if, it is partial-recursive97.
Standard Turing’s Thesis98 A number-theoretic function (or re-
lation, treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if,
and only if, it is Turing-computable99.
8.1 The Church and Turing Theses are false
However, Church’s Thesis ignores the doctrine of Occam’s razor by postulating
a strong identity—and not simply a weak equivalence—between an effectively
computable number-theoretic function and some algorithmically computable
function.
Consequently, Church’s Thesis (Turing’s Thesis) does not admit the possi-
bility of an arithmetical function F that is computable instantiationally but not
algorithmically. It follows that:
Theorem 8 The Church and Turing theses do not hold.
Proof By Corollary 8 Go¨del’s [R(x)] is instantiationally computable as always
true, but it is not algorithmically computable as always true. The lemma follows.
✷
93cf. [Me64], p.233, Corollary 5.13.
94cf. [Me64], p.237, Corollary 5.15.
95cf. [Me64], p.237.
96Church’s (original) Thesis The effectively computable number-theoretic functions are the
algorithmically computable number-theoretic functions [Ch36].
97cf. [Me64], p.227.
98After describing what he meant by “computable” numbers in the opening sentence of his
1936 paper on Computable Numbers [Tu36], Turing immediately expressed this thesis—albeit
informally—as: “. . . the computable numbers include all numbers which could naturally be
regarded as computable”.
99cf. [BBJ03], p.33.
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8.2 Recognising instantiational computability as ‘effective’
It is significant that Go¨del (initially) and Church (subsequently—possibly un-
der the influence of Go¨del’s disquietitude) enunciated Church’s formulation of
‘effective computability’ as a Thesis because Go¨del was instinctively uncomfort-
able with accepting it as a definition that fully captures the essence of ‘intuitive
effective computability’100.
Go¨del’s reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic
function can be computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically.
The possibility that ‘truth’ may be be ‘effectively’ decidable instantiationally,
but not algorithmically, is implicit in Go¨dels famous 1951 Gibbs lecture101,
where he remarks:
“I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a univer-
sal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a certain
property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjec-
ture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imag-
ine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well
founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case
if the proposition in question were some equation F (n) = G(n) of
two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very
great numbers n.”102
Such a possibility is also implicit in Turing’s remarks103:
“The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense)
definable numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or
0 according as n is or is not satisfactory. It is an immediate conse-
quence of the theorem of §8 that P is not computable. It is (so far as
we know at present) possible that any assigned number of figures of
P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently
many figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method
is necessary in order to obtain more figures.”
The need for placing such a distinction on a formal basis has also been
expressed explicitly on occasion104. Thus, Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey105 define
a diagonal function, d, any value of which can be decided effectively, although
there is no single algorithm that can effectively compute d.
Now, the straightforward way of expressing this phenomenon should be to
say that there are well-defined number-theoretic functions that are instantiation-
ally computable, but not algorithmically computable106. Yet, following Church
100See [Si97].
101[Go51].
102Parikh’s paper [Pa71] can also be viewed as an attempt to investigate the consequences
of expressing the essence of Go¨del’s remarks formally.
103[Tu36], §9, para II.
104Parikh’s distinction between ‘decidability’ and ‘feasibility’ in [Pa71] also appears to echo
the need for such a distinction.
105[BBJ03], p. 37.
106Or, preferably, one could borrow the analogous terminology from the theory of functions
of real and complex variables and term such functions as computable, but not uniformly
computable.
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and Turing, such functions are labeled as effectively uncomputable107!
“According to Turing’s Thesis, since d is not Turing-computable, d
cannot be effectively computable. Why not? After all, although no
Turing machine computes the function d, we were able to compute at
least its first few values, For since, as we have noted, f1 = f1 = f1 =
the empty function we have d(1) = d(2) = d(3) = 1. And it may
seem that we can actually compute d(n) for any positive integer
n—if we don’t run out of time.”108
The reluctance to treat a function such as d(n)—or the function Ω(n) that
computes the nth digit in the decimal expression of a Chaitin constant Ω109—as
computable, on the grounds that the ‘time’ needed to compute it increases mono-
tonically with n, is curious110; the same applies to any total Turing-computable
function f(n)111!
9 Conclusions
I have defined what it means for a number-theoretic function to be:
(i) Instantiationally computable;
(ii) Algorithmically computable.
I then show that:
Conclusion 1 If Aristotle’s particularisation is presumed valid over
the structure N of the natural numbers—as is the case under the
standard interpretation of PA—then it follows from the instantia-
tional nature of the constructive definition of the Go¨del β-function
that a primitive recursive relation can be instantiationally equivalent
to an arithmetical relation where the former is algorithmically com-
putable as always true over N whilst the latter is instantiationally
computable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true over
N .
I then show that:
Conclusion 2 IPA(N , Standard) is sound if, and only if, Aristotle’s
particularisation holds over N ; and the latter is the case if, and only
if, PA is ω-consistent.
107The issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects of
our individual, and common, mental ‘concept spaces’, we use the word ‘exists’ loosely in three
senses, without making explicit distinctions between them (see [An07]).
108[BBJ03], p.37.
109Chaitin’s Halting Probability is given by 0 < Ω =
∑
2−|p| < 1, where the summation is
over all self-delimiting programs p that halt, and |p| is the size in bits of the halting program
p; see [Ct75].
110The incongruity of this is addressed by Parikh in [Pa71].
111The only difference being that, in the latter case, we know there is a common ‘program’
of constant length that will compute f(n) for any given natural number n; in the former, we
know we may need distinctly different programs for computing f(n) for different values of n,
where the length of the program will, sometime, reference n.
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Under the standard interpretation IPA(N , Standard) of PA over the domain
N , if [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of PA, then the sequence of
natural numbers (a1, a2, . . . , an) satisfies [A] if, and only if A
∗(a1, a2, . . . , an)
holds in N and we presume that Aristotle’s particularisation is valid over N .
I have now shown that:
Conclusion 3 We can define a sound interpretation IPA(N , Algorithmic)
of PA over the domain N where, if [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . ,
xn)] of PA, then the sequence of natural numbers (a1, a2, . . . , an)
satisfies [A] if, and only if [A(a1, a2, . . . , an)] is algorithmically com-
putable under IPA(N , Algorithmic), but we do not presume that Aris-
totle’s particularisation is valid over N .
It follows that:
Conclusion 4 PA is consistent.
I have then shown that:
Conclusion 5 (Provability Theorem for PA) A PA formula [F (x)]
is PA-provable if, and only if, [F (x)] is algorithmically computable
in N .
It follows that:
Conclusion 6 PA is categorical.
In his 1931 paper, Go¨del showed how to construct a formula [R(x)] with a
single free variable in any Peano Arithmetic such that:
If the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA is assumed to be consistent,
then:
(i) for any PA numeral [n], the PA formula [R(n)] is prov-
able in PA;
(ii) the PA formula [R(x)] is not provable in PA.
I have now shown that:
Conclusion 7 (a) We may conclude from Go¨del’s argument that
[R(x)] is not algorithmically computable as true in N .
(b) [¬(∀x)R(x)] is PA-provable;
(c) PA is not ω-consistent;
(d) The ‘standard’ interpretation IPA(N , Standard) of PA over N is
not sound.
Since the above imples that Go¨del’s formula [R(x)] is computable instanti-
ationally but not algorithmically as true over N , I conclude that:
Conclusion 8 (i) P6=NP;
(ii) the Church and Turing Theses do not hold?
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10 Appendix A: Notation, Definitions and Com-
ments
Notation In this investigation I use square brackets to indicate that the con-
tents represent a symbol or a formula of a formal theory, generally assumed to
be well-formed unless otherwise indicated by the context.
In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed
syntactically as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manip-
ulated upon strictly in accordance with specific rules for such formation and
manipulation—in the manner of a mechanical or electronic device—without any
regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically under an interpre-
tation that gives them meaning.
Moreover, even though the formula ‘[F (x)]’ of a formal Arithmetic may inter-
pret as the arithmetical relation expressed by ‘F ∗(x)’, the formula ‘[(∃x)R(x)]’
need not interpret as the arithmetical proposition denoted by the usual abbre-
viation ‘(∃x)R∗(x).’ The latter denotes the phrase ‘There is some x such that
R∗(x)’. As Brouwer had noted112 , this concept is not always capable of an
unambiguous meaning that can be represented in a formal language by the for-
mula ‘[(∃x)R(x)]’ which, in a formal language, is merely an abbreviation for the
formula ‘[¬(∀x)¬R(x)]’.
By ‘expressed’ I mean here that the symbolism is simply a short-hand abbrevi-
ation for referring to abstract concepts that may, or may not, be capable of a
precise ‘meaning’. Amongst these are symbolic abbreviations which are intended
to express the abstract concepts—particularly those of ‘existence’—involved in
propositions that refer to non-terminating processes and infinite aggregates.
Provability A formula [F ] of a formal system S is provable in S (S-provable) if,
and only if, there is a finite sequence of S-formulas [F1], [F2], . . . , [Fn] such that
[Fn] is [F ] and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [Fi] is either an axiom of S or a consequence
of the axioms of S, and the formulas preceding it in the sequence, by means of
the rules of deduction of S.
The structure N The structure of the natural numbers—namely, {N (the set
of natural numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor function); + (the addition
function); ∗ (the product function); 0 (the null element)}.
The axioms of first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA)
PA1 [(x1 = x2)→ ((x1 = x3)→ (x2 = x3))];
PA2 [(x1 = x2)→ (x′1 = x
′
2)];
PA3 [0 6= x′1];
PA4 [(x
′
1 = x
′
2)→ (x1 = x2)];
PA5 [(x1 + 0) = x1];
PA6 [(x1 + x
′
2) = (x1 + x2)
′];
PA7 [(x1 ⋆ 0) = 0];
PA8 [(x1 ⋆ x
′
2) = ((x1 ⋆ x2) + x1)];
PA9 For any well-formed formula [F (x)] of PA:
[F (0)→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x))].
Generalisation in PA If [A] is PA-provable, then so is [(∀x)A].
Modus Ponens in PA If [A] and [A→ B] are PA-provable, then so is [B].
112[Br08]; see also [An08].
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Standard interpretation of PA The standard interpretation IPA(N , Standard)
of PA over the structure N is the one in which the logical constants have their
‘usual’ interpretations113 in Aristotle’s logic of predicates114, and115:
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain;
(b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol [0];
(c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the [′]
function;
(d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of [+] and
[∗];
(e) the interpretation of the predicate letter [=] is the identity relation.
Simple consistency A formal system S is simply consistent if, and only if,
there is no S-formula [F (x)] for which both [(∀x)F (x)] and [¬(∀x)F (x)] are
S-provable.
ω-consistency A formal system S is ω-consistent if, and only if, there is no
S-formula [F (x)] for which, first, [¬(∀x)F (x)] is S-provable and, second, [F (a)]
is S-provable for any given S-term [a].
Soundness (formal system) A formal system S is sound under an interpre-
tation IS if, and only if, every theorem [T ] of S translates as ‘[T ] is true under
IS ’.
Soundness (interpretation) An interpretation IS of a formal system S is
sound if, and only if, S is sound under the interpretation IS .
Soundness in classical logic. In classical logic, a formal system S is sometimes
defined as ‘sound’ if, and only if, it has an interpretation; and an interpretation
is defined as the assignment of meanings to the symbols, and truth-values to the
sentences, of the formal system. Moreover, any such interpretation is a model of
the formal system. This definition suffers, however, from an implicit circularity: the
formal logic L underlying any interpretation of S is implicitly assumed to be ‘sound’.
The above definitions seek to avoid this implicit circularity by delinking the defined
‘soundness’ of a formal system under an interpretation from the implicit ‘soundness’
of the formal logic underlying the interpretation. This admits the case where, even
if L1 and L2 are implicitly assumed to be sound, S+L1 is sound, but S +L2 is not.
Moreover, an interpretation of S is now a model for S if, and only if, it is sound.116
Categoricity A formal system S is categorical if, and only if, it has a sound
interpretation and any two sound interpretations of S are isomorphic.117
11 Appendix B: Go¨del’s Theorem VII(2)
(Excerpted from [Go31] pp.29-31.)
Every relation of the form x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn), where φ is recursive, is arith-
metical and we apply complete induction on the rank of φ. Let φ have rank
s(s > 1). . . .
φ(0, x2, . . . , xn) = ψ(x2, . . . , xn)
113See [Me64], p.49.
114Thus, Aristotle’s particularisation holds over N in the standard interpretation of PA.
115See [Me64], p.107.
116My thanks to Professor Rohit Parikh for highlighting the need for making such a distinc-
tion explicit.
117Compare [Me64], p.91.
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φ(k + 1, x2, . . . , xn) = µ[k, φ(k, x2, . . . , xn), x2, . . . , xn]
(where ψ, µ have lower rank than s).
. . . we apply the following procedure: one can express the relation x0 =
φ(x1, . . . , xn) with the help of the concept “sequence of numbers” (f)
118 in the
following manner:
x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∼ (∃f){f0 = ψ(x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)(k < x1 →
fk+1 = µ(k, fk, x2, . . . , xn) & x0 = fx1}
If S(y, x2, . . . , xn), T (z, x1, . . . , xn+1) are the arithmetical relations which,
according to the inductive hypothesis, are equivalent to y = ψ(x2, . . . , xn), and
z = µ(x1, . . . , xn+1) respectively, then we have:
x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∼ (∃f){S(f0, x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)[k < x1 →
T (fk+1, k, x2, . . . , xn)] & x0 = fx1} (17)
Now we replace the concept “sequence of numbers” by “pairs of numbers” by
correlating with the number pair n, d the sequence of numbers f (n,d) (f
(n,d)
k =
[n]1+(k+1)d, where [n]p denotes the smallest non-negative remainder of nmodulo
p).
Then:
Lemma 1: If f is an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers and k is an
arbitrary natural number, then there exists a pair of natural numbers n, d such
that f (n,d) and f coincide in their first k terms.
Proof: Let l be the greatest of the numbers k, f0, f1, . . . , fk−1. Determine n
so that
n ≡ fi [mod (1 + (i + 1)l!)] for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1,
which is possible, since any two of the numbers 1 + (i+1)l! (i = 0, 1, . . . , k− 1)
are relatively prime. For, a prime dividing two of these numbers must also
divide the difference (i1 − i2)l! and therefore, since i1 − i2 < l, must also divide
l!, which is impossible. The number pair n, l! fulfills our requirement.
Since the relation x = [n]p is defined by
x ≡ n (mod p) & x < p
and is therefore arithmetical, then so also is the relation P (x0, x1, . . . , xn) de-
fined as follows:
P (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ≡ (∃n, d){S([n]d+1, x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)[k < x1 →
T ([n]1+d(k+2), k, [n]1+d(k+1), x2, . . . , xn)] & x0 = [n]1+d(x1+1)}
which, according to (17) and Lemma 1, is equivalent to x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) (in
the sequence f in (17) only its values up to the (x + 1)th term matter). Thus,
Theorem VII(2) is proved.
Note: Go¨del’s remark that “in the sequence f in (17) only its values up to the
(x + 1)th term matter” is significant for the resolution of the PvNP problem.
The proof of Lemma 10—and consequently of Theorem 1 that P 6=NP if the stan-
dard interpretation of PA is sound—depends upon the fact that the equivalence
between f(n,d) and f cannot be extended non-terminatingly.
118f denotes here a variable whose domain is the sequence of natural numbers. The (k+1)st
term of a sequence f is designated fk (and the first, f0).
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12 Appendix C: PA cannot admit a set-theoretical
model
Let [G(x)] denote the PA formula:
[x = 0 ∨ ¬(∀y)¬(x = y′)]
This translates, under every unrelativised interpretation of PA, as:
If x denotes an element in the domain of an unrelativised interpretation of
PA, either x is 0, or x is a ‘successor’.
Further, in every such interpretation of PA, ifG(x) denotes the interpretation
of [G(x)]:
(a) G(0) is true;
(b) If G(x) is true, then G(x′) is true.
Hence, by Go¨del’s completeness theorem:
(c) PA proves [G(0)];
(d) PA proves [G(x)→ G(x′)].
Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem: In any first-order predicate calculus, the theo-
rems are precisely the logically valid well-formed formulas (i. e. those that are
true in every model of the calculus).
Further, by Generalisation:
(e) PA proves [(∀x)(G(x) → G(x′))];
Generalisation in PA: [(∀x)A] follows from [A].
Hence, by Induction:
(f) [(∀x)G(x)] is provable in PA.
Induction Axiom Schema of PA: For any formula [F (x)] of PA:
[F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x)→ F (x′))→ (∀x)F (x))]
In other words, except 0, every element in the domain of any unrelativised
interpretation of PA is a ‘successor’. Further, x can only be a ‘successor’ of a
unique element in any such interpretation of PA.
12.1 PA and ZF have no common model
Now, since Cantor’s first limit ordinal, ω, is not the ‘successor’ of any ordinal in
the sense required by the PA axioms, and if there are no infinitely descending
sequences of ordinals119 in a model—if any—of set-theory, PA and Ordinal
Arithmetic120 cannot have a common model, and so we cannot consistently
extend PA to ZF simply by the addition of more axioms.
12.1.1 Why PA has no set-theoretical model
We can define the usual order relation ‘<’ in PA so that every instance of the
Induction Axiom schema, such as, say:
(i) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))→ (∀x)F (x))]
119cf. [Me64], p261.
120cf. [Me64], p.187.
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yields the PA theorem:
(ii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y < x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
Now, if we interpret PA without relativisation in ZF in the sense indicated
by Solomon Feferman121 — i.e., numerals as finite ordinals, [x′] as [x∪{x}], etc.
— then (ii) always translates in ZF as a theorem:
(iii) [F (0)→ ((∀x)((∀y)(y ∈ x→ F (y))→ F (x))→ (∀x)F (x))]
However, (i) does not always translate similarly as a ZF-theorem (which
is why PA and ZF can have no common model), since the following is not
necessarily provable in ZF:
(iv) [F (0)→ ((∀x)(F (x) → F (x ∪ {x}))→ (∀x)F (x))]
Example: Define [F (x)] as ‘[x ∈ ω]’.
A significant point which emerges from the above is that we cannot ap-
peal unrestrictedly to set-theoretical reasoning when studying the foundational
framework of PA.
Reason: The language of PA has no constant that interprets in any model
of PA as the set N of all natural numbers.
Moreover, the preceding sections show that the Induction Axiom Schema of
PA does not allow us to bypass this constraint by introducing an “actual” (or
“completed”) infinity disguised as an arbitrary constant - usually denoted by c
or ∞ - into either the language, or a putative model, of PA.
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